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In recent times there has been a surge of interest in seeking out patterns in the aggregate behavior
of socio-economic systems. One such domain is the emergence of statistical regularities in the
evolution of collective choice from individual behavior. This is manifested in the sudden emergence
of popularity or “success” of certain ideas or products, compared to their numerous, often very
similar, competitors. In this paper, we present an empirical study of a wide range of popularity
distributions, spanning from scientific paper citations to movie gross income. Our results show that
in the majority of cases, the distribution follows a log-normal form, suggesting that multiplicative
stochastic processes are the basis for emergence of popular entities. This suggests the existence
of some general principles of complex organization leading to the emergence of popularity. We
discuss the theoretical principles needed to explain this socio-economic phenomenon, and present a
model for collective behavior that exhibits bimodality, which has been observed in certain empirical
popularity distributions.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k,05.65.+b,89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
hit (noun) a person or thing that is successful
popular (adj.), from Latin popularis, from
populus: the people, a people
1: of or relating to the general public,
2: suitable to the majority: as (a) adapted to
or indicative of the understanding and taste of
the majority, (b) suited to the means of the
majority: inexpensive,
3: frequently encountered or widely accepted,
4: commonly liked or approved
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 1.
In a pioneering study of how apparently rational peo-
ple can behave irrationally as part of a crowd, Charles
MacKay [1] had given several illustrations of certain phe-
nomena becoming wildly popular without discernible rea-
son. In fact, he had focussed specifically on examples
where the individuals were behaving clearly contrary to
their self-interest or that of society as a whole, as for
example, the habit of duelling or the practise of witch-
hunting. MacKay termed these episodes “moral epi-
demics”, long before the formal introduction of the con-
cept of social contagion [2] and the use of biological epi-
demic models to study such phenomena, ascribing their
origin to the nature of men to imitate the behavior of
their neighbors.
However, such herding behavior 2 is not limited to the
examples given in MacKay’s book, nor do the outcomes of
∗Electronic address: sitabhra@imsc.res.in
†Electronic address: rajkp@imsc.res.in
1 http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/
2 MacKay referred to such behavior as “gregarious”, in its original
sense of “to flock”.
such behavior need to be so dramatic in their impact as,
say, financial market crashes or publicly sanctioned geno-
cides. In fact, the sudden emergence of a popular prod-
uct or idea, that is otherwise indistinguishable in quality
from its competitors, is a more common example of the
same process at work. These events occur so often that
we take such phenomena for granted; however, the ques-
tion of why certain products or ideas become much more
popular than what their intrinsic quality would warrant
remains a fascinating and unanswered problem in the so-
cial sciences. Watts [3] points this out when he says “. . .
for every Harry Potter and Blair Witch Project that ex-
plodes out of nowhere to capture the public’s attention,
there are thousands of books, movies, authors and ac-
tors who live their entire inconspicuous lives beneath the
featureless sea of noise that is modern popular culture.”
It may be worth mentioning that such popularity may
be of different kinds, one being runaway popularity im-
mediately upon release, and, another being modest ini-
tial popularity followed by ever-increasing popularity in
subsequent periods. The former is thought to be driven
by the advertising blitz preceding the release or launch
of the product while the latter has sometimes been ex-
plained in terms of self-reinforcing effects, where a slight
relative edge in terms of initial popularity results in more
consumers being inclined towards the slightly more pop-
ular product, thereby increasing its popularity even fur-
ther and so on, driving up its popularity through positive
feedback.
As physicists we are naturally interested to see whether
there are general trends that can be observed in popular-
ity phenomena across a large range of contexts in which
they are observed. An allied question is whether this
popularity can be related to any of the intrinsic prop-
erties of the products or ideas, or whether this is en-
tirely an outcome of a sequence of chance events. The
fact that often popular products are seen to be not all
2that qualitatively different from their competitors, or in
some cases, actually somewhat inferior, seems to weigh
against the former possibility. However, we would like to
see whether the empirically observed popularity distribu-
tions also suggests the latter alternative. We also need
to see whether pre-release advertising does indeed play a
role in creating a high initial burst of popularity.
In this article, we first approach the problem empiri-
cally, looking at previous work done on measuring pop-
ularity distributions, as well as presenting some of our
recent analysis of the popularity phenomena occurring
in a variety of different contexts. One remarkable uni-
versality we find is that most popularity distributions we
examine seem to have long tails, and can be fit either by a
log-normal or a power-law probability distribution func-
tion, the exponent of the latter often being quite close to
−2. Another interesting feature observed for some dis-
tributions is their bimodal character, with the majority
of instances occurring at extreme ends of the distribu-
tion, while the center of the distribution is remarkably
under-represented. Both of these features indicate a sig-
nificant departure from the Gaussian distribution that
may have been naively expected. Next, we survey possi-
ble theoretical models for explaining the above features
of the empirical distributions. In particular, we discuss
how log-normal distributions can arise through several
agents making independent decisions in choosing from a
range of products with randomly distributed qualities.
We also present a model of agent-agent interaction that
shows a transition from unimodal to bimodal distribu-
tion of the collective choice, when agents are allowed to
learn from their previous experience. We conclude with
a short discussion on how log-normal and power-law tail
distributions can be generated from the same theoreti-
cal framework, the former occurring when agents choose
independently of other agents (basing their decisions on
individual perceptions of quality) and the latter emerg-
ing when agent-agent interactions are crucial in deciding
the desirability of a product.
II. EMPIRICAL POPULARITY
DISTRIBUTIONS
In studying the popularity distribution of products,
the first question one needs to resolve is how to measure
popularity. While in some cases this may seem rather
obvious, e.g., the number of people buying a particu-
lar book, in other cases it may be difficult to identify
a unique measure that will satisfy everyone. For exam-
ple, the popularity of movies can be measured either in
terms of an average over critics’ opinions published in
major periodicals, web-based voting in movie-related on-
line communities, the income generated when a movie is
running in theaters, or the cumulative sales and rentals
from DVD stores. In most cases, we have let the quality
of the available data decide our choice of which popular-
ity measure to use.
An equally important question one needs to answer is
the nature of the statistical distribution with which to fit
the data. In almost all cases reported below, we observe
distributions that deviate significantly from the Gaussian
distribution in having extremely long tails. The occur-
rence of such fat-tailed distributions in so many instances
is very exciting, as it indicates that the process of emer-
gence of popular products is more than just N agents
independently making single binary (i.e., yes or no) deci-
sions to adopt a particular choice. However, to go beyond
this conclusion and to identify the possible process in-
volved, one needs to ascertain accurately the true nature
of the distribution. This brings up the question of how
to obtain the probability density function (PDF) from
the empirical data. The method generally used is to ar-
range the data into a suitable number of bins to obtain
a histogram, which in an appropriate limit will provide
the PDF. This works fine when the underlying distribu-
tion is Gaussian with sharply decaying tails; however, for
long-tailed distributions, it is exactly the extreme ends
one is interested in, which have the least representation
in the data. As a result, the PDF is extremely noisy
at the tails, and hence, it is often hard to conclude the
nature of the distribution. Often, one can remove some
of the noise by using the PDF to generate the cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF), which is essentially the
probability that an event is larger than a given size 3. As
larger quantities of data points are now accumulated in
each of the bins, the tail becomes smoother in the CDF
plot. However, the data binning process is susceptible
to noise, that can change significantly the shape of the
distribution, depending on the size and boundary values
of each bin. This can lead to serious errors, e.g., wrongly
identifying the tail of the distribution to be following a
power law. Even if the distribution indeed has a power-
law tail, one may obtain a quantitatively erroneous value
for the power-law exponent by using graphical methods
based on linear least square fitting on a double logarith-
mic scale [4].
A better way to examine the nature of the tail of a
distribution is to avoid binning altogether and to switch
to a rank-ordered plot of the data, which allows one to
focus on the upper tail of the distribution containing the
data points of largest magnitude. These plots are of-
ten referred to as Zipf plots, after the Harvard linguist,
G. K. Zipf, who used such rank-frequency plots of the
occurrence of the most common words in the English
language to establish a scaling relation for written nat-
ural languages [5, 6]. In this procedure, the data points
are ranked or arranged in decreasing order of their magni-
tude. Note that the CDF can be obtained from the rank-
ordered plot by simply exchanging the abscissae and the
ordinate, and suitably scaling the axes. Thus, by avoid-
3 The CDF, Pc(x), of a given process is obtained by integrating
the corresponding PDF, P (x), i.e., Pc(x) =
∫∞
x
P (x′)dx′.
3ing binning one can make a better judgement of the na-
ture of the distribution. To quantitatively determine the
parameters of the distribution, one of the most robust
methods is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [7].
For example, if the underlying distribution Pc(x) has a
power-law tail, then the CDF exponent can be obtained
from the MLE method by using the formula
α = n
n∑
i=1
[
ln
xi
xmin
]−1
, (1)
where, xmin corresponds to the minimum value of x for
which the power-law behaviour holds. Similarly, one can
obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters
for log-normal and other distributions.
It is, of course, obvious that the results from the three
different plots, namely, the PDF, the CDF and the rank-
ordered, should be related to each other. So, for exam-
ple, if the CDF of an empirically obtained distribution is
found to exhibit a power-law tail which can be expressed
as,
Pc(x) ∼ x−α, (2)
with the characteristic exponent 4 α, it is easy to show
that the PDF and the rank-ordered plots will also exhibit
power-law behavior [9]. Moreover, the exponents of the
power-law seen in these two cases will be related to the
characteristic exponent of the CDF, α, as follows: the
PDF will follow the relation,
P (x) ∼ x−(α+1), (3)
while, the rank-ordered plot will exhibit the relation,
xk ∼ k−1/α, (4)
where xk denotes the k-th ranked data point. The above
examples are all given for the case when the underlying
distribution has a power-law tail; similar relations can
be derived for other underlying distributions, e.g., log-
normal.
A. Examples
In the following paragraphs we have briefly surveyed
previous empirical work on popularity distribution, as
well as, presented some of our own recent analysis of pop-
ularity data from a broad variety of contexts. In most
cases, we have characterized the empirical CDF with a
log-normal fit over the entire distribution. However, in
4 This exponent α is often referred to as the Pareto exponent,
after the Italian economist, V. Pareto, who was the first to report
power law tails for the CDF of income distribution across several
European countries [8].
those cases where the data is available only for the upper
tail of the distribution, such a procedure is not possi-
ble. In these cases, we have presented a rank-ordered
plot of the data and have tried to fit a power-law char-
acterized by the CDF exponent, α. In this context, we
note that most previous observations of popularity dis-
tributions had focussed on the upper tail, and fitted a
power-law on this. However, we find that the entire dis-
tribution is very often a much better fit to the log-normal
distribution [10]. We conclude with a brief discussion of
why data that fit log-normal much better has often been
reported in the literature to follow a power-law tail.
1. City Size.
Possibly the first ever empirical observation of a long-
tailed popularity distribution is that of cities, as mea-
sured by their population, which was first proposed in
1913 by Auerbach [11]. Later, this basic idea was refined
by many others, most notably Zipf [6]. In fact, the last
mentioned work has become so well-known that, often
the term Zipf’s law is used to refer to the idea that city
sizes follow a cumulative probability distribution having
a power-law tail [12] with exponent α = 1. Over the
years, several empirical studies have been published in
support of the validity of Zipf’s law [13]. However, other
empirical studies have found significant deviations from
the exact form given by Zipf [14]. In a recent review,
the combined estimate of the exponent α from 29 dif-
ferent studies is found to be significantly larger than 1
suggesting a less extended tail than implied by a strict
interpretation of Zipf’s law [15]. All these studies have
focused on the upper tail (i.e., larger cities) of the dis-
tribution. If one also considers the smaller cities, the
whole distribution often fits a double-Pareto log-normal,
i.e., a distribution which is log-normal in the bulk but
has long tails at the two ends [16]. Even the power-law
fit of the tail has itself been called into question by a
study of the size distribution of US cities over the period
1900-1990 [17]. These results are of special significance
to our study, as it shows that the fat-tailed distribution
of popularity of cities need not be a power-law but could
be explained by other distributions.
2. Company Size.
Almost of similar vintage to the city size literature is
the work on company size, measured in terms of sales
or employees. Note that, both of these are measures of
popularity of the company, the former measuring its pop-
ularity among the consumers of its products, while the
latter measures its popularity in the labor market. In
1932, Gibrat formulated the law of proportional growth,
essentially a multiplicative stochastic process for explain-
ing company growth, which predicts that the distribu-
tion of firm size would follow a log-normal distribu-
4tion [18, 19]. While this has indeed been reported from
empirical data [20, 21], there have been also reports of a
power-law tail [22]. In particular, Axtell [23] has looked
at the size of US companies (listed in the U.S. Census Bu-
reau database) in terms of the number of employees, that
yields a CDF with power law tail whose exponent α ∼ 1.
When the size was expressed in terms of receipts (in dol-
lars) this also yielded a power law CDF with α ∼ 0.99.
3. Scientists and Scientific Papers.
The study of popularity in the field of science has a
rich and colorful history [24]. One of the earliest such
studies is that on the visibility of scientists, as measured
by subjective opinions elicited from a sample of the scien-
tific community [25]. The skewed nature of the visibility
because of misallocation of credit in the field of science,
where an already famous scientist gets more credit than
is due compared to less well-known colleagues, has been
termed as the Mathew effect [26]. This is quite similar to
the unequal degree of popularity seen in show-business
professions, e.g., among movie actors and singers. A
more objective measure for the popularity of scientists
is the total number of citations to their papers [27].
The popularity of individual scientific papers can also
be analysed in terms of citations to them [28]. Price [29]
had tried to give a theoretical model based on cumu-
lative advantage along with supporting evidence show-
ing that the distribution of citations to papers follow a
power-law tail. More recently, in a study [30] analyzing
papers in the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI)
database, as well as papers published in Physical Review
D, Redner concluded that the probability distribution of
citations follow a power law tail with an exponent close
to −3. However, in a later work looking at all papers
published in Physical Review journals over the past 110
years, this distribution was found to be fit better by a
log-normal [31] (Fig. 1, inset).
In addition to the popularity of individual papers mea-
sured by the number of their citations, one can also define
the popularity of the journals in which these papers are
published by considering the total number of citations
to all articles published in a journal. In Fig. 1, we have
plotted the cumulative distribution of the total citations
in 1997-99 to all papers ever published in a journal. The
data has been fit with a log-normal distribution; max-
imum likelihood estimates of parameters for the corre-
sponding distribution are µ = 6.37 and σ = 1.75.
4. Newspaper and Magazines.
The popularity of scientific journals naturally leads us
to wonder about the popularity distribution for general
interest magazines as well as newspapers. An obvious
measure of popularity in this case is the circulation fig-
ure. Fig. 2 shows the CDF of the top 740 magazines ac-
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FIG. 1: The cumulative distribution function for the total
number of citations to a journal in a given year, for all jour-
nals (∼ 5500) listed in ISI Journal Citation Report (Science
edition) for the years 1997-1999, fit by a log-normal curve (in
red). The inset (from Ref. [31]) shows the cumulative prob-
ability distribution of citations, C(k), against the number of
citations, k, to all papers published from July 1893 through
June 2003 in the Physical Review journals, fit by a log-normal
curve (in red).
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FIG. 2: Cumulative distribution function of the 740 most
circulated magazines in UK, fit by a log-normal curve (in
red). The inset shows the rank-ordered plot of the top 200
newspapers in USA according to circulation.
cording to average net circulation per issue in the United
Kingdom 5 in 2005. The figure shows an approximately
log-normal fit; maximum likelihood estimates of param-
eters for the corresponding distribution are µ = 10.79
and σ = 1.18. Next, we analyzed the circulation fig-
ures for the top 200 newspapers in the USA for the year
2005 according to their circulation 6. Fig. 2(inset) shows
the corresponding rank-ordered plot with an approximate
power-law fit over a decade yielding Zipf’s law, which is
5 http://www.abc.org.uk
6 http://www.accessabc.com/reader/top150.htm
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FIG. 3: Cumulative probability distribution of the number of
votes given by registered users of IMDb to movies and TV
series released or shown between the years 2000-2004, fit by a
log-normal curve (in red). (Inset) The probability distribution
of the IMDb rating of a movie, averaged over all the votes
received.
supported by the maximum likelihood estimate of the ex-
ponent for the cumulative probability density function,
α ∼ 1.12.
5. Movies.
Movie popularity can be measured in a variety of ways,
e.g., by looking at the votes given by users of various
movie-related online forums. One of the largest of such
forums is the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) 7 that al-
lows registered users to rate films (and television shows)
in the range 1-10 (with 1 corresponding to “awful” and
10 as “excellent”). We looked at the cumulative distribu-
tion of all votes received by movies or TV series shown
between 2000-2004 (Fig. 3). The tail of the distribu-
tion approximately fits a log-normal distribution, with
maximum likelihood estimates of the corresponding pa-
rameters, µ = 8.60 and σ = 1.09. Next, we look at
the distribution of average rating given to these items.
As the minimum and maximum ratings that an item can
receive are 1 and 10, respectively, this distribution is nec-
essarily bounded. The skewed probability distribution of
the average rating resulting from our analysis is shown
in Fig. 3 (inset).
The measures used above have many drawbacks as in-
dicators of movie popularity, particularly so when they
are aggregated to produce average values. For example,
users may judge different movies according to very differ-
ent information, with so-called classic movies faring very
differently from recently released movies that have very
little information available about them. Also, it does not
7 http://www.imdb.com
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FIG. 4: Cumulative distribution of total gross income for
movies released across theaters in USA during 2000-2004, fit
by a log-normal curve (in red). The inset shows the distribu-
tion of movie income according to the opening weekend gross.
cost anything to vote for a movie, so that the vital ele-
ment of competition among movies to become popular is
missing in this measure. In contrast, looking at the gross
income distribution of movies that are being shown at
theaters gives a sense of the relative popularity of movies
that have roughly equal amount of information available
about them. Also, this kind of “voting with one’s wal-
let” is a truer indicator of the viewer’s movie preferences.
The freely available datasets about weekly earnings of
most movies released across theaters in the USA makes
this a practical exercise. For our study we have concen-
trated on data from The Movie Times 8 and The Num-
bers 9 websites for the period 2000-2004. Although total
gross may be a better measure of movie popularity, the
opening gross is often thought to signal the success of a
particular movie. This is supported by the observation
that about 65-70 % of all movies earn their maximum
box-office revenue in the first week of release [32]. The
rank-ordered distribution for the opening, as well as the
total gross, show an approximate power law with an ex-
ponent 1/α ∼ −1/2 in the region where the top grossing
movies are located [33]. However, when the data are ag-
gregated together we find that the distribution (Fig. 4) is
better fit by a log-normal 10 (similar to the observation
of Redner vis-a-vis citations) [34]. The maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the log-normal distribution parameters
yield µ = 3.49 and σ = 1.00. Further, we observe that
the total gross distribution is just a scaled version of the
opening distribution, which essentially implies that the
popularity distribution of movies is decided at the open-
ing itself. An additional feature of interest is that both
8 http://www.the-movie-times.com
9 http://www.the-numbers.com/
10 We have also verified this for the income distribution of Indian
movies.
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FIG. 5: (Left) The total gross (GT , in dollars) of a movie vs its production budget (in dollars). (Right) The total gross (GT ,
in dollars) of a movie vs the number of theaters it is released on the opening weekend.
the opening and the total gross distributions are bimodal
(Fig. 4, inset), implying that most movies either do very
well or very badly at the box office.
We have tried to see whether the popularity of indi-
vidual movies correlate with its production quality (as
measured by production budget). Fig. 5 (left) shows a
plot of the total gross vs production budget for a large
number of movies released between 2000-04 whose bud-
get exceeded 106 $. As is clear from the figure, although
in general, movies with higher production budget tend to
earn more, there is no significant correlation (the corre-
lation coefficient is only 0.62). One can also argue that
the determination of success of a movie on its opening
implies the key role of pre-release advertising. Although
the data for advertising budget is often unavailable, we
can use as a surrogate, the data about the number of
theaters that a movie is initially released at, since the
advertising cost will scale with this quantity. As is ob-
vious from Fig. 5 (right), the correlation here is worse,
indicating that advertising has often very little role to
play in deciding the success or otherwise of a movie in
becoming popular. In this context, one may note that De
Vany & Walls have looked at the distribution of movie
earnings and profit as a function of a variety of variables,
such as, genre, ratings, presence of stars, etc. and have
not found any of these to be significant determinants [35].
To make a quantitative analysis of the relative perfor-
mance of movies, we have defined the persistence time τ
of a movie as the time (measured in number of weekends)
upto which it is being shown at theaters. We observe that
most movies run for upto about 10 weekends, after which
there is a steep drop in their survival probability. The
empirical data seem to fit a Weibull distribution quite
well.
6. Websites and Blogs
Zipf’s law for the distribution of requests for pages
from the web was first reported by Glassman [36]. By
tracing web accesses from DEC’s Palo Alto facilities,
105 HTTP requests were gathered and the rank-ordered
distribution of pages was shown to have an exponent
∼ −1. This was supported by a popular article [37]
which observed Zipf’s law when analysing the incoming
page-requests to a single site (www.sun.com). However,
subsequent investigation of the page request distribution
seen by web proxy caches using traces from a variety of
sources, found the rank-order exponent to vary between
0.64 to 0.83 [38]. The deviation from the earlier result
(showing exact Zipf’s law) was ascribed to the fact that
web accesses at a web server and those at a web proxy
are different, because the former includes requests from
all users on the Internet while the latter includes only
those users from a fixed group. Access statistics for web
pages have also been analysed by Adamic and Huberman
from the access logs of about 60000 individual usage logs
from America Online [39]. The resulting cumulative dis-
tribution of website popularity, according to the number
of unique visits to a website by users, showed a power
law fit with α very close to 1.
Another obvious measure of webpage popularity is the
number of links to it from another webpage. Distribu-
tion of incoming links to a webpage (i.e., URLs point-
ing to a certain HTML document) for the nd.edu do-
main, have been shown to obey a power law with ex-
ponent ≃ −2.1 [40]. This power law was quantitatively
confirmed (i.e., the same exponent value of 2.1 was re-
ported) over a much larger data set involving a web-crawl
on the entire WWW with 2×108 webpages and 1.5×109
links [41]. While the power law distribution of popu-
larity of websites according to the number of incoming
links has been well-established as a power law, among
web-pages of the same type (e.g., the set of US newspa-
per homepages) the bulk of the distribution of incoming
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FIG. 6: Cumulative distribution function for blog popularity
measured by the number of incoming links a blog receives
from other weblogs listed in the TTLB Blogosphere ecosystem
within the past 7-10 days. The curve is the best log-normal
fit to the data. The inset shows the rank-ordered plot of blog
popularity according to the number of visits to a blog in a
single day, in the TTLB ecosystem.
links deviates strongly from a power law, exhibiting a
roughly log-normal shape [42].
The finding that the micro-structure of popularity
within a group is closer to a log-normal distribution has
created some controversy among researchers involved in
measuring the popularity distribution of blogs 11 which
have over the past few years picked up a large following
all over the web. Shirky [44] had arranged 433 weblogs in
rank order according to number of incoming links from
other blogs and had claimed an approximate power law
distribution. In contrast to this, Drezner & Farrell [43]
conducted a study of the incoming link distribution of
over 4000 blogs dealing almost exclusively with political
topics, and found the distribution to be much better fit
by a log-normal than a power law. Other studies have
made contradictory claims about whether the popularity
of blogs is better fit by a log-normal or power-law tailed
distribution [45, 46].
We have also analysed the popularity distribution of
blogs according to citations in other blogs, using three
different blogosphere ecologies, i.e., directories of blog
listings. Such ecologies scan all blogs registered with
them for (i) the number of links they receive from other
blogs in their list, as well as (ii) the number of visits to
that blog. These two measures of popularity complement
each other, as the former looks at who is getting the most
11 A blog or weblog has been defined as a web page with minimal
to no external editing, providing on-line commentary, periodi-
cally updated and presented in reverse chronological order, with
hyperlinks to other online sources [43]. Blogs can function as
personal diaries, technical advice columns, sports chat, celebrity
gossip, political commentary, or all of the above.
links from other bloggers, while the latter shows which
blogs are actually receiving the most readers. The most
extensive data that we have analyzed comes from the
TTLB Blogosphere ecosystem 12 that lists 52048 blogs.
In Fig. 6 we show the CDF for the popularity of blogs
from this ecology, measured from the number of links
to that blog seen in the “front page” of other member
blogs within the past 7-10 days. This can be considered
a rolling snapshot of the relative popularity of different
blogs at a particular instant of time. For comparison, we
also looked at data from two other ecologies, namely, the
Technorati 13 and the Blogstreet 14 ecosystems, and ob-
served qualitatively almost identical behavior. The CDF
(Fig. 6) shows an approximately log-normal fit; maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of parameters for the corre-
sponding distribution are µ = 1.98 and σ = 1.51. We
have also analyzed the popularity of blogs listed in the
TTLB ecosystem according to traffic, i.e., views per day
(Fig. 6, inset), which shows a power law over almost two
decades for the rank-ordered plot. The maximum like-
lihood estimate of the corresponding exponent for the
cumulative probability density yields α ∼ 0.67.
7. File Downloads.
Another web-related measure of popularity is that of
file downloads. There are numerous file repositories in
the net which allow visitors to download files either freely
or for a fee. We focussed on files stored in the MAT-
LAB Central File Exchange 15, which are computer pro-
grams. We looked at the number of downloads of all
files over a period of one month during early 2006. The
CDF [Fig. 7 (left)] shows an approximately log-normal
fit; maximum likelihood estimates of parameters for the
corresponding distribution are µ = 3.76 and σ = 0.89.
8. Groups.
A fertile area for observing the distribution of popular-
ity is in the arena of social groups. While the member-
ship of clubs, gangs, co-operatives, secret societies, etc.,
are difficult to come by, with the rising popularity of the
internet it is easy to obtain data for online communities
such as those in Yahoo 16 or Orkut 17. By observing the
memberships of each of the groups in the community that
a user can join, one can have a quantitative measure of
the popularity of these groups. An analysis of the Yahoo
groups resulted in a fat-tailed cumulative distribution of
12 http://truthlaidbear.com/
13 http://www.technorati.com/
14 http://www.blogstreet.com/
15 http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/
16 http://groups.yahoo.com
17 http://www.orkut.com
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FIG. 7: (Left) Cumulative distribution function for the number of downloads of different files in 1 month during early 2006
from the MATLAB file exchange site. (Right) Cumulative distribution function for the number of members in different Yahoo
groups under the Business & Finance (squares) and Computers & Internet (diamonds) categories. Groups with less then 5
members are not considered. For both figures, the curves (in red) are the best log-normal fits to the data.
the group size [47]. Even though the distribution has a
significant curvature over the entire range, the tail fits a
power law for slightly more than a decade, with exponent
α = 1.8.
We have recently carried out a smaller-scale study
of the popularity of Yahoo groups 18. As in the ear-
lier study, the popularity of the groups in each category
has been estimated by the number of group members.
Fig. 7 (right) looks at the cumulative distributions of the
group size for two categories, namely Business & Finance
and Computer & Internet, which comprise 182086 and
172731 groups respectively. However, unlike the power-
law reported in the earlier study, we found both the dis-
tributions to approximately fit a log-normal form, with
the parameters for the corresponding distributions being
µ = 2.80, σ = 2.00 and µ = 3.10, σ = 2.05, respectively.
One can also look at the popularity of individual mem-
bers of an online group, which has been analysed for a
different type of community in the web: that formed by
the users of the Pretty-Good-Privacy (PGP) encryption
algorithm. To ensure that identities are not forged, users
certify one another by “signing” the other person’s public
encryption key. In this manner, a directed network (the
“web of trust”) is created where the vertices are users and
links are the user certifications. A measure of popularity
in this case will be the number of certifications received
by an user from other users, i.e., the number of incoming
links for a vertex in the “web of trust”. The in-degree
cumulative distribution has been reported to be a power
law with the exponent α ≃ 1.8 [48].
18 The entire Yahoo groups community is divided into 16 categories,
each of which are then further divided into subcategories.
9. Elections.
Political elections are processes that can be viewed as
contests of popularity between individual candidates, as
well as parties. The fraction of votes received by candi-
dates is a direct measure of their popularity, regardless
of whether the electoral system uses a majority voting
rule (where the candidate with the largest number of
votes wins) or a proportional representation (parties get-
ting representation at the legislative house proportional
to their fraction of the popular vote). Such studies have
been carried out for, e.g., the 1998 Brazilian general elec-
tions [49], which looked at the fraction of votes received
by candidates for the positions of state deputies. The
resulting frequency distribution was fit by a power law
with exponent very close to −1. The cumulative distri-
bution, however, revealed that about 90% of the candi-
dates’ votes followed a log-normal distribution, with a
large dispersion that resulted in the apparent power law.
We have carried out an analysis of the distribution of
votes for a number of general elections in Canada and
India. The data about votes for individual candidates in
Canada was obtained from the website Elections Canada
On-line 19 for the general elections held in 1997, 2000,
2004 and 2006. The total number of candidates in each
election varied between 1600-1800, there were over ∼ 300
electoral constituencies and the total number of votes
cast varied around 13 million. Each constituency was di-
vided into hundreds of polling stations, thereby allowing
us to obtain a micro-level picture of the popularity of the
candidates at a particular constituency across the differ-
ent polling stations. Fig. 8 (left) shows the results of
19 http://www.elections.ca/
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FIG. 8: Canadian elections: (Left) The rank-ordered plot of candidate popularity measured by the fraction of votes received
by him or her, for four successive general elections. The inset shows the cumulative frequency distribution function for this
popularity measure. Note the region of linear decay in the middle of the curve. (Right) Cumulative probability distribution
function for the fraction of votes received by a candidate for all constituencies in the 2000 general election. The inset shows
the cumulative distribution function of the vote fraction for candidates for all polling booths at each constituency in the above
election. Note that a constituency can have hundreds of polling booths.
our analysis, indicating an exponential decay of the tail
of the popularity distribution for all the elections being
considered. The results don’t change even if we consider
the number of votes, rather than the vote fraction. Fig.
8 (right) shows that the distribution of popularity across
polling stations has almost an identical distribution to
that seen over the larger scale of electoral constituencies.
Note that we did not observe the popularity of parties for
Canada, as the total number of parties were only about
10.
Next, we looked at the corresponding data for the 2004
general elections in India obtained from the website of
the Election Commission of India 20. The total number
of candidates is 5435, about half of whom belonged to
230 registered parties, who contested from a total of 543
electoral constituencies, while the total number of votes
cast was about 400 million. Fig. 9 (left) shows that the
rank-ordered popularity (measured by the vote fraction)
distribution for candidates in an Indian general election
is qualitatively similar to that of Canada, except for the
presence of a kink indicative of the bimodal nature of the
distribution. This implies that candidates either receive
most of the votes cast by electors in that constituency
or very few votes. It maybe due to the very large num-
ber of independent candidates (i.e., without affiliation to
any recognized party) in Indian elections compared to
Canada. This is supported by our analysis of popularity
of recognized political parties [Fig. 9 (right)] that shows
an exponential decay at the tail. Note that the popular-
ity of a party is measured by the total votes received by
a party divided by the number of constituencies in which
20 http://www.eci.gov.in/
it contested. This is same (upto a scaling constant) as
the percentage of votes received by candidates belonging
to a party, averaged over all the constituencies in which
the party had fielded candidates.
10. Books.
An obvious popularity distribution based on product
sales is that of books, especially in view of the record-
breaking sales in recent times of the Harry Potter series
of books. However, the lack of freely available data about
exact sales figures has so far prevented detailed analysis
of book popularity. It was reported in a recent paper [50],
that the cumulative distribution of book sales from the
online bookseller Amazon 21 has a power-law tail with
α ∼ 2. However, one should note that Amazon does not
reveal exact sales figures, but rather only the rank ac-
cording to sales; therefore, this distribution was actually
based on a heuristic relation between rank and sales pro-
posed by Rosenthal [51]. Needless to say, this is at best a
very rough guide to the exact sales figures (e.g., although
the sale of Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince fluctu-
ated a lot during the few weeks following its publication,
it remained steady as the top ranked book in Amazon)
and is likely to yield misleading distribution of sales. A
more reliable dataset, if somewhat old, has been com-
piled by Hackett [52] for the total number of copies sold
in USA of the top 633 bestselling books between 1895 and
1965. Newman [7] has reported the maximum likelihood
estimate for the exponent of the power law fit to this data
21 http://www.amazon.com
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FIG. 9: Indian election: (Left) The rank-ordered plot of candidate popularity measured by the fraction of votes received, for
the 2004 Lok Sabha election. The inset shows the frequency distribution of the vote fraction, clearly indicating a bimodal
nature with candidates receiving either most of the votes cast or very few. (Right) Cumulative probability distribution function
of party popularity for the 2004 election, measured by the fraction of votes received by candidates from that party, over all the
constituencies it contested in.
as α ∼ 2.51. Fig. 10 (left) shows the rank-ordered plot
of this data, indicating an approximate power law fit for
slightly more than a decade, with an exponent of −0.4.
11. Language.
Fig. 10 (right) shows the cumulative distribution of the
first-language speaker population for different languages
around the world. The data has been obtained from Eth-
nologue 22 which provides the number of first-language
speakers (over all countries in the world) wherever pos-
sible. Out of a total of 7299 languages listed in its 15th
edition, we have considered above 6650 languages for
which information about the number of speakers is avail-
able. The figure shows a long tail with an approximately
log-normal fit; maximum likelihood estimates of param-
eters for the corresponding distribution are µ = 8.78 and
σ = 3.17. Note that this kind of popularity distribution
is different from the others we have discussed so far as the
speakers are not really free to choose their first language;
rather this is connected to the population growth rate of
a particular linguistic community. A similar kind of pop-
ularity distribution is that for family names, which has
been analysed by Miyazima et al [53] for Japanese family
names and Newman [7] for American family names, both
reporting cumulative distribution functions with power
law tails having α close to 1. However, for Korean family
names [54] the distribution was reported to be exponen-
tially decaying.
22 http://www.ethnologue.com/
12. Other Popularity distributions.
Unlike the distribution of family names discussed
above, the frequency of occurrence of given names (or
first names) are indeed subject to waves of popularity,
with certain names appearing to be very common at a
particular period. A recent study [55] has looked at the
distribution of most popular given names in England and
Wales over the past millennium, and has claimed a long-
tailed distribution for the same. Another popularity dis-
tribution is that of tourist destinations, as measured by
the number of tourist arrivals over a time period. A
study [56] that has ranked 89 countries, focussing on the
period 1980-1990, have found evidence for a log-normal
distribution as the best fit to the data.
The occurrence of superstars (i.e., extremely successful
performers) in popular music has led to a relatively large
amount of literature by economists on the occurrence of
popularity [57, 58, 59, 60]. Chung & Cox have used the
number of gold-records by performers as the measure of
their artistic success, and found the tail of this popularity
distribution to approximately follow a power law [61].
Another study [62] looked at the longevity of music bands
in the list of Top 75 best-selling recordings, and observed
a stretched exponential distribution 23. However, a more
recent study [63] has shown the survival probability of a
music recording on the Billboard Hot 100 chart to be fit
better by the log-logistic distribution.
23 While the term stretched exponential distribution is quite com-
mon in the physics literature, we observe that in other scientific
fields it is more commonly referred to as Weibull distribution.
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FIG. 10: (Left) The rank-ordered plot of bestselling books (that sold 2 million copies or more) according to the number of
copies sold in USA between 1895 to 1965. Adapted from Ref. [7], data provided by M. E. J. Newman. (Right) Cumulative
distribution function for the size of the population of first-language speakers for over 6650 languages. The data was obtained
from Ethnologue. The curve (in red) indicates the best log-normal fit to the data.
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FIG. 11: Weekend gross per theater for a movie (scaled by
the average weekend gross over its theatrical lifespan), after it
has run for W weekends, averaged over the number of movies
that ran for that long. The initial decline follows a power-
law with exponent β ≃ −1 (the fit is shown by the broken
line). The inset (from Ref. [64]) shows the probability that
a paper will be cited t years after publication in a Physical
Review journal, in the years 1952 and 1972, as well as over
the period 1932-1982. Over the range of 2 − 20 years the
integrated data is consistent with a power law decay having
an exponent −0.94 (broken line in red).
B. Time-evolution of popularity
Here we look briefly at how popularity evolves over
time. For movies, we look at the gross income per the-
ater over time (Fig. 11). This is a better measure of the
dynamics of movie popularity than the time-evolution of
the weekly overall gross income, because a movie that
is being shown in a large number of theaters has a big-
ger income simply on account of higher accessibility for
the potential audience. Unlike the overall gross that de-
cays exponentially with time, the gross per theater shows
a power-law decay in time with exponent β ≃ −1 [65].
This has a striking similarity with the time-evolution of
popularity for scientific papers in terms of citations. It
has been reported that the citation probability to a paper
published t years ago, decays approximately as 1/t [64]
[Fig. 11 (inset)]. Note that, Price [29] had also noted
a similar behavior for the decay of citations to papers
listed in the Science Citation Index. In a very different
context, namely, the decay in the popularity of a web-
site (as measured by the rate of download of papers from
the site) over time t has also been reported to follow an
inverse power-law, but with a different exponent [66].
C. Discussion
The selection of (mostly) long-tailed empirical popu-
larity distributions presented above underlines the fol-
lowing broad features of such distributions: (i) the entire
distribution seem to be fit by a log-normal curve (in the
few cases where the entire distribution is not available,
the upper tail seems to fit a power law with character-
istic exponent α which is often close to 1, corresponding
to the exact form of Zipf’s law); (ii) in some cases the
distribution shows a bimodal character, with most of the
instances occurring at the two ends of the distribution;
(iii) the decay of popularity in some cases seem to show
a simple power law decay, declining inversely with time
elapsed since release; (iv) the persistence time at high
levels of popularity show a Weibull distribution in many
instances.
The first of these features may come somewhat as a sur-
prise, because for many popularity distributions, power
law tails have been reported with various exponents, of-
ten significantly different from 1. However, we observe
that very often log-normal distributions have been mis-
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FIG. 12: A schematic diagram of the emergence of popularity
as a relation between agents and objects (products or ideas).
takenly identified as having power law tails. In fact this
is a very common error, especially if the variance of the
log-normal distribution is sufficiently large. To see this,
note that the log-normal distribution,
P (x) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
e−(lnx−µ)
2/2σ2 , (5)
can be written as (on taking logarithm on both sides),
lnP (x) = − (lnx)
2
2σ2
+ (
µ
σ2
− 1)− ln
√
2piσ − µ
2
2σ2
, (6)
which is a quadratic curve in a doubly logarithmic plot.
However, a sufficiently small part of the curve will appear
as a straight line, with the slope depending on which seg-
ment of the curve one is focussing attention [7, 67].This
is the origin of most of the power law tails with expo-
nent α 6= 1 that has been reported in the literature on
popularity distributions.
III. MODELS OF POPULARITY
DISTRIBUTION
From the perspective of physics, popularity can be
viewed as an emergent outcome of the collective decision
process in a society of individual agents exercising their
free will (as reflected in their individual preferences) to
choose between alternative products or ideas (Fig. 12).
In a system without authoritarian control, agents differ
in their personal preferences which are determined by the
information available to the agent about the possible al-
ternatives. However, in any real-life scenario with uneven
access to information, a seemingly well-informed agent
may influence the choice of several other agents [68].
Thus, the emergence of a popular product is a result of
the self-organized coordination of choices made by het-
erogeneous entities.
The simplest model of collective choice is one where
the agents decide independently of each other and select
alternatives at random with a one-step decision process.
It is easy to see that the possible alternatives will not be
significantly different in terms of popularity from each
other. In particular, the popularity distribution aris-
ing from such a process will not have long tails. There
are two possible alternative modifications of this simple
model that will allow it to generate distributions similar
to the ones seen empirically. The first option is to al-
low interactions between agents where the choice of one
agent can influence that of another. While this is often
true in real-life, we also observe long-tailed distributions
much before the interaction among agents (and the re-
sulting dissemination of information) has had a chance
to influence the popularity. For example, the long-tailed
distribution of movie popularity, in terms of gross earn-
ing, is seen at the opening weekend itself, long before po-
tential movie viewers have had a chance to be influenced
by other moviegoers. The second option for generating
realistic popularity distribution gets around this prob-
lem: here we replace the single-step decision process by
one comprising of multiple sub-decisions (as there may
be many factors involved in making a particular deci-
sion), each of which contribute to the overall decision to
purchase a particular product. Therefore, the probabil-
ity of any particular entity achieving a particular degree
of popularity can be expressed as the product of prob-
abilities of each of the underlying factors satisfying the
required condition to make an agent opt for that entity.
As is easily seen, the resultant distribution arising from
such a multiplicative stochastic process has a log-normal
form, agreeing with many of the empirically observed dis-
tributions 24.
While the bulk of the popularity distributions, showing
a log-normal nature, can therefore be plausibly explained
as the product of the multiplicative stochastic structure
underlying even apparently simple decision processes,
this would still leave unanswered the reason for the wide
occurrence of Zipf’s law in other instances. We now turn
to the first option for extending the simple model out-
lined above, i.e., investigating the influence of an agent’s
choice behavior on other agents. It turns out there have
been many proposed mechanisms to explain the ubiquity
of power-law tailed distributions employing interactions.
However, from the point of view of the present paper,
the most relevant (and general) model seems to be the
Yule process [69], as modified by Simon [70]. This is es-
sentially a cumulative advantage process by which the
relatively more popular entities get even more popular
by virtue of being more well-known.
The Yule-Simon process can be described as follows:
Suppose initially there are n agents, each of whom are
free to choose one of a number of products. Subse-
quently, the number of agents is augmented by unity at
each time step. At any point in time, when the total
number of agents is m, the number of distinct products,
each of which have been chosen by k agents is denoted
24 One can argue that the probability distribution of collective
choice may also reflect the distribution of quality amongst vari-
ous competing entities; however, in this case the popularity dis-
tribution would be essentially identical to the quality distribu-
tion, which a priori can follow any arbitrary distribution. The
universality of long-tailed popularity distributions and the seem-
ing absence of any correlation between popularity and quality
(when it can be measured in any well-defined manner) would
argue against this hypothesis.
13
by f(k,m). Then, given that, (i) there is a constant
probability, γ, that an agent chooses a completely new
product (i.e., one that has not been chosen before by any
of the agents) and (ii) the probability of choosing a prod-
uct that has already been chosen by k agents is propor-
tional to kf(k, n), one obtains an asymptotic popularity
distribution that has a power-law tail 25 with exponent
α = 11−γ . If the appearance of a new product is relatively
infrequent, i.e., γ is extremely small, then the exponent
α ≃ 1 (i.e., Zipf’s law).
Another feature of popularity distributions that has
been mentioned earlier is that, in some cases, they ap-
pear to have a bimodal nature. We now present a simple
agent-based model [73] that shows how bimodal and uni-
modal distributions of popularity can arise very simply
through agents interacting with each other, and reacting
to information about what the majority are choosing in
the previous time step.
A. A Model for Bimodal Distribution of Collective
Choice
We have already discussed the simplest model of col-
lective choice in which individual agents make completely
independent decisions. For binary choice (i.e., each agent
can only choose between two options) the emergence of
collective choice is equivalent to a one-dimensional ran-
dom walk with the number of steps equal to the number
of agents. Therefore, the outcome will be normally dis-
tributed, with the most probable outcome being an equal
number of agents choosing each alternative. While such
unimodal distributions of popularity are indeed observed
in some situations, as mentioned earlier in this article
many real-life examples show the occurrence of bimodal
distributions indicative of highly polarized choice behav-
ior among agents resulting in the emergence of a highly
popular product. This polarization suggests that agents
not only opt for certain choices based on their personal
preferences, but are also influenced by other agents in
their social neighborhood. Also, the personal preferences
may themselves change over time as a result of the out-
come of previous choices, e.g., whether or not their choice
agreed with that of the majority. This latter effect is an
example of global feedback process that we think is cru-
cial in the occurrence of bimodal behavior.
We now present a general model of collective decision
that shows how polarization in the presence of individual
choice volatility can be achieved with an adaptation and
learning dynamics of the personal preference. In this
model, the choice of individual agents are not only af-
fected by those of their neighbors, but, in addition, their
preference is modified by their previous choice as well as
25 Note that, the models of Price [29], Barabasi-Albert [71] and
Redner [72] are all special cases of this general mechanism.
information about how successful their previous choice
behavior was in coordinating with that of the majority.
Here it is assumed that information about the intrin-
sic quality of the alternative products is inaccessible to
the agent, who takes the cue from what the majority is
choosing to decide which one is the “better choice”. Ex-
amples of such limited global information about the ma-
jority’s preference available to an agent are the results of
consumer surveys and publicity campaigns disseminated
through the mass media.
The simplest, binary choice version of our model is de-
fined as follows. Consider a population of N agents, each
of whom can be in one of two choice states S = ±1 (e.g.,
to buy or not to buy a certain product, to vote Party A
or Party B, etc.). In addition, each agent has an individ-
ual preference, θ, that is chosen from a uniform random
distribution initially. At each time step, every agent con-
siders the average choice of its neighbors at the previous
instant, and if this exceeds its personal preference, makes
the same choice; otherwise, it makes the opposite choice.
Then, for the i-th agent, the choice dynamics is described
by:
St+1i = sign(
∑
j∈N
JijS
t
j − θti), (7)
where sign (x) = +1, if x > 0, and = −1, otherwise.
The coupling coefficient among agents, Jij , is assumed
to be a constant (= 1) for simplicity and normalized by
z (= |N |), the number of neighbors. In a lattice, N is the
set of spatial nearest neighbors and z is the coordination
number, while in the mean field approximation, N is the
set of all other agents in the system and z = N − 1.
The individual preference, θ, evolves over time as:
θt+1i = θ
t
i + µS
t+1
i + λS
t
i , if S
t
i 6= sign(M t),
= θti + µS
t+1
i , otherwise, (8)
where M t = (1/N)
∑
j S
t
j is the collective decision of
the entire community at time t. Adjustment to previ-
ous choice is governed by the adaptation rate µ in the
second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8), while the
third term, governed by the learning rate λ, represents
the correction when the individual choice does not agree
with that of the majority at the previous instant. The de-
sirability of a particular choice is assumed to be related to
the fraction of the community choosing it; hence, at any
given time, every agent is trying to coordinate its choice
with that of the majority. Note that, for µ = 0, λ = 0,
the model reduces to the well-known zero-temperature,
random field Ising model (RFIM).
Random neighbor and mean field model. For math-
ematical convenience, we choose the z neighbors of an
agent at random from the N − 1 other agents in the sys-
tem. We also assume this randomness to be “annealed”,
i.e., the next time the same agent interacts with z other
agents, they are chosen at random anew. Thus, by ig-
noring spatial correlations, a mean field approximation
is achieved.
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FIG. 13: (Left) The spatial pattern of choice (S) in the absence of learning (λ = 0) in a two-dimensional square lattice of
1000× 1000 agents after 500 iterations starting from a random configuration. The figure is a magnified view of the the central
100 × 100 region showing the absence of long-range correlation among the agents. (Right) The spatial pattern of choice (S)
with learning (λ = 0.05) in the same system, with a majority of agents now in the choice state S = +1. The magnified view of
the central 100 × 100 region shows coarsening of regions having agents aligned in the same choice state.
For z = N − 1, i.e., when every agent has the infor-
mation about the entire system, it is easy to see that,
in the absence of learning (λ = 0), the collective de-
cision M follows the evolution equation rule: M t+1 =
sign[(1−µ)M t−µ∑t−1τ=1M τ ]. For 0 < µ < 1, the system
alternates between the ordered statesM = ±1 with a pe-
riod ∼ 4/µ. The residence time at any one state (∼ 2/µ)
diverges with decreasing µ, and for µ = 0, the system re-
mains fixed at one of the ordered states corresponding to
M = ±1, as expected from RFIM results. At µ = 1, the
system remains in the disordered state, so that M = 0.
Therefore, we see a transition from a bimodal distribu-
tion of the collective decision, M , with peaks at non-zero
values, to an unimodal distribution of M centered about
0, at µc = 1. When we introduce learning, so that λ > 0,
the agents try to coordinate with each other and at the
limit λ→∞ it is easy to see that Si = sign(M) for all i,
so that all the agents make identical choice.In the simula-
tions, we note that the bimodal distribution is recovered
for µ = 1 when λ ≥ 1.
For finite values of z, the population is no longer “well-
mixed” and the mean-field approximation becomes less
accurate the lower z is. For z << N , the critical value of
µ at which the transition from a bimodal to a unimodal
distribution occurs in the absence of learning, µc < 1. For
example, µc = 0 for z = 2, while it is 3/4 for z = 4. As
z increases µc quickly converges to the mean-field value,
µc = 1. On introducing learning (λ > 0) for µ > µc, we
again notice a transition to an ordered state, with more
and more agents coordinating their choice.
Lattice. To implement the model when the neighbors
are spatially related, we consider d-dimensional lattices
(d = 1, 2, 3) and study the dynamics numerically. We re-
port results obtained in systems with absorbing bound-
ary conditions; using periodic boundary conditions leads
to minor changes but the overall qualitative results re-
main the same. It is worth noting that the adaptation
term disrupts the ordering expected from results of the
RFIM for d = 3, so that for any non-zero µ the system
is in a disordered state when λ = 0.
In the absence of learning (λ = 0), starting from a
initial random distribution of choices and personal pref-
erences, we observe only very small clusters of similar
choice behavior [Fig. 13 (left)] and the average choice M
fluctuates around 0. In other words, at any given time
an equal number (on average) of agents have opposite
choice preferences. Introduction of learning in the model
(λ > 0) gives rise to significant clustering as well as a
non-zero value for the collective choice M . We find that
the probability distribution of M [Fig. 14 (left)] evolves
from a single peak at 0, to a bimodal distribution as λ
increases from 0. This is similar to second-order phase
transition in systems undergoing qualitative changes at a
critical threshold. The collective decisionM switches pe-
riodically from a positive value to a negative value having
an average residence time which diverges with λ and with
N . For µ > λ > 0, large clusters of agents with identical
choice are observed to form and dissipate throughout the
lattice [Fig. 13 (right)]. After sufficiently long times, we
observe the emergence of structured patterns having the
symmetry of the underlying lattice, with the behavior of
agents belonging to a particular structure being highly
correlated. Note that these patterns are dynamic, being
essentially concentric waves that emerge at the center
and travel to the boundary of the region, which continu-
ally expands until it meets another such pattern. Where
two patterns meet their progress is arrested and their
common boundary resembles a dislocation line. In the
asymptotic limit, several such patterns fill up the entire
system. These patterns indicate the growth of clusters
with strictly correlated choice behavior. The central site
in these clusters act as the “opinion leader” for the entire
group. This can be seen as analogous to the formation
of “cultural groups” with shared preferences [74]. It is
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FIG. 14: (Left) The probability distribution of the collective decision M in a two-dimensional square lattice of 100×100 agents.
The adaptation rate µ = 0.1, and the learning rate λ is increased from 0 to 0.1 to show the transition from unimodal to bimodal
behavior. The system was simulated for 5×104 iterations to obtain the distribution. (Right) The order parameter < |M | > for
one- and two-dimensional lattices. The adaptation rate is µ = 0.1, while λ is increased gradually to show the transition to an
ordered state. Note that for higher values of µ the two curves are virtually identical. There is very little system size-dependence
of the curves.
of interest to note that distributing λ from a random
distribution among the agents disrupts the symmetry of
the patterns, but we still observe patterns of correlated
choice behavior. It is the global feedback (λ 6= 0) which
determines the formation of large connected regions of
agents having similar choice behavior. This is reflected
in the order parameter, 〈|M |〉, where 〈· · ·〉 indicates time
averaging. Fig. 14 (right) shows the order parameter in-
creasing with λ in both one and two dimensional lattices,
signifying the transition from a disordered state to an or-
dered state, where neighboring agents have coordinated
their choices.
Our model seems to provide an explanation for the ob-
served bimodality in a large number of social or economic
phenomena, e.g., in the distribution of the gross income
for movies released in theaters across the USA during
the period 1997-2003 [33]. Bimodality in this context
implies that movies either achieve enormous success or
are dismal box-office failures. Based on the model pre-
sented here, we conclude that, in such a situation the
moviegoers’ choice depends not only on their neighbors’
choice, but also on how well previous action based on such
neighborhood information agreed with media reports and
reviews of movies indicating the overall or community
choice. Hence, the case of λ > 0, indicating the reliance
of an individual agent on the aggregate information, im-
poses correlation among agent choice across the commu-
nity which leads to a bimodal gross distribution.
Based on a study of the rank distribution of movie
earnings according to their ratings [75], we further spec-
ulate that movies made for children (rated G) have a
significantly different popularity mechanism than those
made for older audiences (PG, PG-13 and R). The for-
mer show striking similarity with the rank distribution
curve obtained for λ = 0, while the latter are closer to
the curves corresponding to λ > 0. This agrees with the
intuitive notion that children are more likely to base their
choices about movies (or other products, such as toys) on
the choice of their friends or classmates, while adults are
more likely to be swayed by reports in mass media about
the popular appeal of a movie. This suggests that one can
tailor marketing strategies to different segments of the
population depending on the role that global feedback
plays in their decisions. Products whose target market
has λ = 0 can be better disseminated through distribut-
ing free samples in neighborhoods; while for λ > 0, a
mass media campaign blitz will be more effective.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have primarily made an attempt to
ascertain the general empirical features inherent in many
popularity phenomena. We observe that the distribution
of popularity in various contexts often exhibit long tails,
the nature of which seem to be either following a log-
normal form or a power law with the exponent α ≃ 1
(Zipf’s law). While the log-normal distribution would
arise naturally in any multiplicative stochastic process,
in the context of popularity it would be natural to inter-
pret it as a manifestation of the interplay of the multiple
factors involved in an agent making a decision to adopt
a particular product or idea. Further, there is no ne-
cessity for interactions among agents for this particular
distribution in popularity to be observed. On the other
hand, distributions with power law tails would seem to
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necessarily entail inter-agent interactions, e.g., a process
whereby agents follow the choice of other agents, with
a particular choice becoming more preferable if many
more agents opt for it 26. This is not necessarily an
irrational “herding” effect; for example, in the case of
popularity of cities, the larger the population of a city,
the more likely it is to attract migrants, owing to the
larger variety of employment opportunities. Thus the
very fact that more agents have chosen a particular alter-
native may make that choice more preferable than others.
Seen in this light, the popularity distribution should show
a log-normal distribution in situations where individual
quality preferences play an important role in making a
choice, while, in cases where the choice of other agents is
a paramount influence in the decision process of an agent,
Zipf’s law should emerge 27. In either case, a stochastic
process is sufficient to generate the popularity distribu-
tions seen in reality. This suggests that the emergence of
popularity can be explained entirely as an outcome of a
sequence of chance events.
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26 In the economics literature, this is referred to as positive exter-
nality [76]
27 Montroll & Shlesinger [77] have shown that a simple extension
to multiplicative stochastic processes can generate power-law
tails from a log-normal distribution. Recently, Bhattacharyya
et al [78] have also proposed a very simple model showing the
asymptotic emergence of Zipf’s law in the presence of random
interaction among agents; it is interesting in the context of our
statements here that, if the mean field theoretic arguments used
in the above paper are extended to the case of no interactions
amongst agents, they would suggest a log-normal distribution.
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